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Five options offered for 2002 Farm Bill
by William Edwards, extension economist, 515-294-6161,
wedwards@iastate.edu
The Farm Security andRural Investment Act of2002, better known as
the 2002 Farm Bill, offers
farmers and landowners a
chance to update the base
acres and yields that are used
to calculate their commodity
program payments. The Farm
Service Agency has defined
five separate options from
which to choose.
The number of acres eligible
for a soybean base is based on
actual crop acres from 1998
through 2001. Eligible acres
are the smaller of the average:
• actual planted and prevented
planted soybean acres, or
• total acres of program crops
minus the acres in existing
bases.
For example, if the producer
planted 500 total acres of corn
and soybeans (50/50 rotation)
each of the past four years, and
Option 1
The first option is to retain
only the acreage bases that the
producer had under the past
program. These are shown as
2002 Product Flexibility Con-
tracts (PFC) acres on the Farm
Summary Report sent out by
FSA around August 1. The
example in this article shows
current bases of 300 acres for
corn and 25 acres for oats.
Prior programs did not include
bases for oilseeds, such as
soybeans. If the producer has
grown any soybeans in the
past four years, option 1 will
probably not be favorable.
Farmers who have grown only
corn and have not increased
yields since the early 1980s are
the only ones who would find
option 1 attractive.
Option 2
Under option 2, producers can
retain existing PFC acreage
bases and add an oilseed base.
www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm
Pre-harvest new-crop corn and
soybean pricing strategies show
incentives for using options
markets .......................... Page 3
Are we better off without govern-
ment stocks overhanging the
market? .......................... Page 6
Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing to
the Ag Decision Maker Hand-
book, the following updates are
included.
Crop Planning Prices—
File A1-10 (2 pages)
Livestock Planning Prices—
File B1-10 (1 page)
Please add these files to your
handbook and remove the out-
of-date material.
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his/her current bases are 300 acres of corn and
25 acres of oats, he/she could claim up to 175
acres toward his/her soybean base. However, if
the producer averaged only 150 acres of soy-
beans in 1998–2001, then the soybean base will
be only 150 acres.
Producers who grow both corn and soybeans,
and who have a current PFC corn base some-
what larger than their average corn acres
during 1998–2001, are most likely to maximize
payments under option 2.
Option 3
Under option 3, the soybean base is the
producer’s average actual acres of soybeans for
1998 through 2001. However, if this is greater
than what the producer’s soybean base would be
under option 2, he/she must reduce his/her base
acres of other crops by the difference in soybean
acres. In the example farm, the soybean base
would increase from 175 acres in option 2 to 250
acres in option 3. Therefore, the oats base would
have to decrease by 25 acres and the corn base
by 50 acres.
If the producer has an existing base for oats, it
will probably pay to shift it to his/her soybean
base, as program payments for oats are quite
small. Payments for other crops, such as corn,
sorghum or wheat, are generally higher than for
soybeans, however, so shifting acres from those
crops to soybeans would reduce total payments.
Only farmers who can maximize their soybean
base by shifting oats base acres only will be
likely to choose option 3. This is an unlikely
situation in Iowa.
Option 4
The only option that allows for
updating base acres is the one
designated as option 4 by FSA.
New bases are assigned for all
program crops, equal to the
average number of planted and
prevented planted acres from
1998 through 2001. In the ex-
ample both corn and soybeans
would have a 250-acre base. Farmers whose
new corn base would be not substantially
smaller than their existing PFC corn base will
probably prefer option 4.
This is also the only option that allows for
updating program yields. FSA offers two differ-
ent methods for computing new program yields,
both based on average yields from 1998 through
2001. The average yields are calculated as the
total bushels of each crop produced during
1998–2001 period, divided by the total acres of
each crop harvested during the period.
The producer can also elect to keep his/her old
program yields. It is unlikely that these will be
higher than recent yields, however. An excep-
tion might be when no production data is avail-
able and the new yield is based on 75 percent of
the county average during the past four years
Option 5
Option 5 is exactly like option 3 except that the
producer can shift less than the maximum acres
allowed from other crop bases into the soybean
base. In the example, only the 25 acres of oats
base is shifted to the soybean base. It will
usually not pay to shift corn or other crop base
acres to soybeans.
Most farmers in Iowa will choose either option 2
(retain existing corn base and yield and add a
soybean base) or option 4 (update both base
acres and yields). If an oats base exists, option 5
can be used to convert it to soybean base and
still retain the corn base.
Example Farm
2002 PFC acres are 300 for corn and 25 for oats.
Actual plantings for 1998 through 2001 have been
250 acres of corn and 250 acres of soybeans each year.
Acreage bases under each option are:
Corn Oats Soybeans
Option 1 300 25 0
Option 2 300 25 175
Option 3 250 0 250
Option 4 250 0 250
Option 5 300 0 200
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The tradeoff is between maximizing the corn
base acres and increasing program yields.
Updated program yields apply only to counter-
cyclical payments, however, and current price
forecasts for the 2002 crop are near or above the
levels at which these payments would be made.
For direct payments, maximizing corn base
acres is all that really matters. In future years,
counter cyclical payments may come back into
play.
Two electronic spreadsheets are available for
analyzing options for commodity acreage bases
and yields. More details plus a hand worksheet
are available under Crop Cost and Returns at
the Ag Decision Maker Web site or from ISU
Extension publication FM-1872a, “Commodity
Programs for Crops.” The Farm Bill Payment
Analyzer can be downloaded from the Ag
Decision Maker Web site at:
www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm. The Farm
Service Agency (FSA) will be using a program
developed at Texas A and M University, which
can be accessed at:
http://www.afpc.tamu.edu/models/base/.
Pre-harvest new-crop corn and soybean pricing
strategies show incentives for using options
markets
by Robert Wisner, extension grain marketing specialist,
rwwisner@iastate.edu, 515-294-6310; Dean Baldwin and Neal Blue,
Ohio State University
Recent research on pre-harvest pricingstrategies for the 1985–86 through2001–02 marketing years confirms our
earlier work showing significant incentives for
pre-harvest pricing with the use of options
markets. Previous research through the 1997
marketing year identified potential $18,000 to
$19,000 average yearly gains in net income for a
1,000 acre cash grain farm (half corn and half
soybeans) versus harvest cash sales.
These results came from pricing 80 percent of a
10-year moving average of the farm’s production
with corn put option purchases in mid-May, and
20 percent with hedge sales in July for harvest
delivery.
Soybeans were priced with synthetic puts
(hedge sale of November futures, plus purchase
of call options two strike prices out of the
money). Calls were purchased to take advan-
tage of possible weather rallies in late spring or
early summer, and were sold the first week of
July to avoid a strong seasonal tendency toward
declining call premiums into late summer and
fall. From July onward, price protection was
retained through the hedge sales.
Years after short crops
If the previous year’s U.S. production was a
weather-reduced short crop (production fell
below the previous year’s use due to adverse
weather over a sizeable part of the Corn Belt,
but not necessarily in your area), grain is
priced in late February before harvest with
hedge sales of December futures. Pre-harvest
pricing in the winter in those years typically
offered higher income than pricing at planting
time or waiting until harvest time. Hedge sales
were closed out in mid October for soybeans
and in early November for corn.
Additional marketing gains were available in
many years, especially in the post-1995 Free-
dom-to-Farm years, by taking advantage of
post-harvest basis improvement and market
carry (premium of July futures prices over
harvest-delivery futures). Although these gains
were not considered in the pre-harvest study,
the pre-harvest strategies analyzed in this
study would give farmers the flexibility to store
grain and gain from basis improvement after
harvest.*
*(For information on how to implement these post harvest strategies,
see “MRP Modules” on http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/ )
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Case farms
For the analysis, we used two actual northwest
Iowa farms, one in Lyon County and one in
O’Brien County. The O’Brien County farm had
higher and more stable yields than the Lyon
County farm, but gains from pre-harvest mar-
keting were similar for both farms. The analysis
also was done for a farm in northwest Ohio,
with very similar results to those from the Iowa
farms. All marketing-related costs were de-
ducted from the gross price that was received.
Synthetic puts
In the updated study, the statistically most
significant strategy for the 1985–2001 period
was the use of synthetic puts on both corn and
soybeans. A synthetic put position is created by
selling a portion of the crop through hedge sales
on the futures market or with elevator con-
tracts, to protect against declining prices. Then,
the same volume of call options is purchased to
allow the farmer to retain upward price flexibil-
ity, in case new developments should cause
prices to rise later on.* The earlier study ana-
lyzing prices through 1997 identified corn put
options purchases (combined with a small
amount of new-crop hedge sales in early July)
as the statistically best performing strategy.
Using the same timing and sales volumes but
synthetic puts instead of puts, average income
from the pre-harvest strategies for these farms
was around $19,000 to $20,000 per year higher
than harvest sales. In the years following short
U.S. crops, if synthetic puts (call purchases two
strike prices out of the money plus hedge sales)
were used and calls were held until early July,
the average annual income gains were reduced
by slightly more than a thousand dollars per
year versus straight hedge sales in the futures
market. Purchasing at the money corn puts in
May rather than using out of the money syn-
thetic puts reduced annual average income
gains versus harvest sales to around $16,000 to
$17,000 per year over the 1985–2001 time
period.
Statistical performance
Statistical tests (two-tailed t tests) were used to
see if these income gains might be due to ran-
dom chance. Test results indicated the probabil-
ity of occurrence by chance over this time period
ranged from less than one percent to about four
percent. In other words, the tests indicated that
a seasonal pattern in new-crop prices has
persisted over the 1985–2001 period.
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the pattern has per-
sisted since 1975. The figures show changes in
December corn and November soybean futures
from late February (after weather-induced short
U.S. crops) or mid-May (in years following
normal crops) to harvest time, for individual
years since 1975.
It should be emphasized that
• these strategies did not provide higher prices
than the harvest cash market every year, and
• past performance does not guarantee future
results.
Over the study period, gains over harvest cash
sales occurred about 80 percent of the time for
corn and about 67 percent of the time for soy-
beans. The 2002 crop year is an example of
years when new-crop prices depart from the
normal tendency to decline from spring to fall.
Pricing with puts or synthetic puts in such
years provides considerably higher prices than
forward contracts signed in the winter or
spring, before widespread crop problems be-
came obvious.
Early pricing and revenue insurance
In most years since the 1996 Freedom-to-Farm
legislation, the best pre-harvest pricing oppor-
tunities have shown a strong tendency to come
very early in the life of the contract—often a
year or more ahead of harvest, and with winter
prices offering somewhat better opportunities
than pricing during the planting season. How-
ever, our results for the entire 1985–2001
period show moderately lower returns from
routinely pricing in February rather than May.
Market behavior in creating private-sector
incentives for long-term grain storage to replace
*(For information on how to implement these post harvest strategies,
see “MRP Modules” on http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/ )
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CCC inventories suggests the pattern of higher
early pricing opportunities may continue in the
future.
For farmers who price a substantial part of
production before harvest, Crop Revenue
Coverage Insurance or Revenue Assurance
(with the harvest price option) may be a useful
tool for managing production risk. These two
tools replace lost production at harvest replace-
ment value by increasing insurance coverage if
futures prices rise from winter to the following
fall.
Risks in pricing grain below the loan rate
Corn and soybean growers should be cautioned
that there is substantial risk in hedging or
forward contracting new-crop soybeans before
harvest when new-crop bids are well below
CCC loan rates.
This is because of the exposure to risk of declin-
ing LDP payments if prices rise. This risk can
be partially managed with options markets, but
at significant cost. LDP risks were not taken
into account in this study. The new farm legisla-
tion exposes corn growers to slightly more LDP
risk in pre-harvest pricing than in the past, due
to the increase in loan rates and a likely in-
crease in corn plantings in the future. The Iowa
corn loan rates are approximately 9 cents higher
than the pre-2002 rates. Because of a reduction
in the soybean loan rate, the LDP risk is lower
than in the past, but still potentially quite
significant.  In summary, new-crop contract bids
and hedging prices well below the loan rate
would create a significant LDP risk in pre-
harvest pricing of corn and soybeans, unless
options markets are used to retain upward price
flexibility.
The 2002 agricultural legislation also introduces
another risk management problem that in-
creases the importance of using options markets
in pricing before harvest. This new risk is the
risk of reduced or lost counter-cyclical payments
as grain prices rise.
Figure 1. Change in December Corn Futures, 3rd. 
Week of May vs. early Nov.; & 4th. Wk. of Feb.vs. 
Early Nov. After Short Crops, 1975-2001
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Figure 2. Change in November Soybeans 3rd. 
Week of May vs. mid-Oct., & 4th. Wk. of Feb.vs. 
Oct. After Short U.S. Crops, 1975-2001
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. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
materials can be made available in alternative formats for ADA
clients. To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA,
Permission to copy
Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension
materials contained in this publication via copy
machine or other copy technology, so long as the
source (Ag Decision Maker Iowa State
University Extension ) is clearly identifiable
and the appropriate author is properly credited.
Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th
and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410
or call 202-720-5964.
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of
May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Stanley R. Johnson, director,
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of
Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa.
6 September 2002
When I go out on speaking engage-ments, a common audience commentalludes to the fact that while prices
during the last four years were extremely low,
the year ending stocks did not seem excessively
high. That got me wondering, were the crop
prices of the last four years as bad as they
seemed or do things in the past always seem
better in hindsight? As a part of our ongoing
examination of the impact of the 1996 Farm Bill
on crop agriculture, we took a look at that
question.
As we all know, season average corn prices
during the last four years were significantly
below the peak achieved during the 1995 crop
year. In fact, it looks like the season average
price of around $1.90 received by farmers for
corn during the now ending 2001 crop year will
be some 40 percent below what was received in
the 1995 crop year. But where does that $1.90
stand compared to prices of the last three
decades or so?
Looking at prices since 1973 tells the story and
it ain’t pretty. Corn prices for the last four crop
years, 1998 through 2001, are four of the six
lowest season average prices in the last 29
years. The other two low price years were 1986
and 1987. But circumstances were considerably
different in those years. Stock levels, then,
really were large. The year 1986 ended with a
241 day supply of corn and 1987 with a 200 day
supply. By way of contrast the year ending
stocks for the last four years have been in the
range of 60 to 71 days supply.
In other words, the price of corn was about
$2.00 for both 1987 and 2001. However, the
1987 crop year ended with a 200 day supply of
corn while 2001 is projected to end with a 60
day supply. Quite a contrast, huh?
Remember when “everybody” said that a major
reason crop prices tended to be low was because
government stocks “overhung” the market?
Another piece of conventional wisdom bites the
dust.
Actually it’s the absence of some of the trusty
old farm program provisions that allowed this
to happen. Again the data suggest that without
a price support type loan rate program and with
no threat of set-asides the next year and, rely-
ing on LDPs as a supplement to price, there is
no incentive for the marketplace to bid up the
price of crops unless adverse weather results in
severely tightened supplies. While bad weather
here or abroad may provide a respite from low
prices, it’s surely not a long-term solution.
Are we better off without government stocks
overhanging the market?*
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of
Agriculture, director, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, University of Tennes-
see, (865) 974-7407, dray@utk.edu
*Reproduction permission granted  from Daryll
E. Ray and the Agricultural Policy Analysis
Center, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN
